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Abstract 
Policy debate about funding criteria for drugs used to treat rare, orphan diseases is gaining 
prominence. This study presents evidence from a discrete choice experiment using a convenience 
sample of university students to investigate individual preferences regarding public funding for 
drugs used to treat rare diseases and common diseases. This pilot study finds that: other things 
equal, the respondents do not prefer to have the government spend more for drugs used to treat 
rare diseases; that respondents are not willing to pay more per life year gained for a rare disease 
than a common disease; and that respondents weigh relevant attributes of the coverage decisions 
(e.g., costs, disease severity, treatment effectiveness) similarly for both rare and common 
diseases. The results confirm the importance of severity and treatment effectiveness in 
preferences for public funding. Though the first study of its kind, the results send a cautionary 
message regarding the special treatment of orphan drugs in coverage decision making.  
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Orphan disease and their treatments are currently the focus of considerable policy attention.    
This policy attention arises because those who suffer from an orphan disease are perceived to be 
disadvantaged under the prevailing model of development for medical treatments, especially 
drugs.  A number of factors inhibit the development of treatments for rare disease and access to 
those treatments that are developed. Orphan diseases are by definition rare (Wastfelt et al., 
2006): in Europe, an orphan disease is defined as serious, life-threatening and affecting fewer 
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than 1 in 2,000 people (European Committee for Orphan Medicinal Products); Canada lacks an 
accepted definition, but the Canadian Organization for Rare Disorders (Canadian Organization 
for Rare Disorders, )defines a rare disease as affecting fewer than 1 person per 2,000 people; and 
in the United States the Orphan Drug Act (1983) defined an orphan disease as affecting fewer 
than 200,000 persons in the US
1
 or more than 200,000 persons and the expectation that drug 
development costs will not be recovered from sales (Dear et al., 2006).    
 
Because the orphan diseases are rare, the pharmaceutical industry has little financial incentive to 
develop new medicines for them. The small market size makes the return on investment 
insufficient to attract private capital. Treatments that are developed face a series of hurdles 
making it to market and getting placed on insurance formularies. Clinical evidence of safety and 
efficacy is often less strong because of small patient samples in randomized clinical studies and 
the reliance on surrogate markers of effectiveness that are not always well-linked to final 
outcomes (Drummond et al., 2007b). The high fixed costs of development and the small number 
of patients lead to high cost-per-patient (DiMasi et al., 1991; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2001). 
Consequently, relatively high incremental cost-effectiveness ratios and the poor value for money 
frequently lead to denial of coverage (Drummond et al., 2007a).   
 
Several governments (e.g., United States, Japan, the European Union) have introduced special 
financial incentives such as tax credits to spur the development of treatments (“orphan drugs”) 
for rare diseases (Dear et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2004; Denis et al., 2009)
2
. Such incentives 
mitigate the industry’s high risks and lower potential return on investments in treatments for rare 
diseases. These incentive schemes have increased numbers of requests for the Orphan 
Designation of drugs by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European 
Medicines Agency (EMEA) (Denis et al., 2009). However, such policies are of limited value if 
treatments developed ultimately fail to get covered by insurers because of their high cost-
effectiveness ratios. In response to this latter problem, some have proposed that funders apply a 
different, higher, cost-effectiveness threshold for drugs used to treat rare diseases (see, e.g., 
discussion in (Drummond et al., 2007a)). This policy recommendation, however, is 
controversial.   
 
Arguments for setting a higher cost-effectiveness threshold for orphan drugs vary, but the two 
most commonly invoked are rights-based arguments and the rule-of-rescue. Rights-based 
arguments posit that all members of society are entitled to access to a minimum amount of health 
care. Given this premise, rare disease sufferers have a right to a basic level of quality health care 
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 Given the current US population, the implied incidence rate is less than 1.3 per 2000 persons.  
2
 Such policies require that “orphan treatments” be defined. The Orphan Designation procedure at the EMEA,  states 
that to qualify a medicine must meet two conditions: a) the medicinal product is intended for the diagnosis, 
prevention or treatment of a life-threatening or chronically debilitating condition that either affects less than 1 in 
2,000 individuals; or that without incentives is unlikely to generate sufficient return on investment to justify the 
expenditure and b) there is an absence of solution or the drug brings a significant benefit compared to the present 
situation (Denis et al., 2009). 
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even if treatment does not offer the largest health gain for its cost (Hughes et al., 2005). The 
rule-of-rescue principle asserts that society should come to the aid of those facing immediate, 
often life-threatening danger. In the orphan drug debate, the underlying premise of this principle 
is used to argue that society should not abandon the most severely ill individuals with rare 
diseases who need highly specialized treatment and have no other treatments available (Hughes 
et al., 2005; Dolan and Olsen 2002).  
 
Opponents of such a policy offer a corresponding set of arguments. Hughes et al. (Hughes et al., 
2005), argue that orphan diseases are not inherently life-threatening, although many are 
debilitating and reduce life-expectancy. McCabe et al. (2006) characterize arguments based on 
the rule-of-rescue as emotional reactions to identifiable individuals in catastrophic events, but 
that unknown patients will become identifiable in the future and hence it is an ethically invalid 
principle for policy-making. But perhaps the most common objection to setting higher cost-
effectiveness thresholds for orphan drugs derive from the principle of maximizing the health gain 
achieved with society’s limited health care resources (Schlander, 2008). The opportunity cost of 
such a policy is larger health losses among those who suffer from common, highly prevalent 
diseases (Dear et al., 2006; Hughes et al., 2005; McCabe et al., 2006). 
 
This debate has proceeded in a virtual vacuum of evidence regarding the views of the public 
regarding such a special status for drugs used to treat orphan diseases. We know that members of 
the public are, in general, willing to sacrifice a reduction in the total amount of health gain 
generated to achieve a more equitable distribution of health or health gains and to respond to 
those suffering severe ill health (Nord, 1993; Ubel et al., 1998; Cookson and Dolan, 1999; Dolan 
et al., 2005). We do not know, however, if this holds for responding to the needs of those with 
rare diseases. The only direct evidence on this point offers partial support at best. The UK’s 
Citizen’s Council of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
recommended that the National Health Service pay higher prices for ultra-orphan drugs 
(affecting fewer than 1000 people in the UK) provided that in addition to being very rare, the 
disease is severe, life-threatening, and there is evidence of health gain from treatment (NICE 
Citizens Council, 2004). So although rareness factors into their reasoning, rareness alone does 
not justify differential thresholds.  
 
This paper presents the results of a pilot study that uses a discrete choice experiment to 
investigate individuals’ preferences regarding public funding for drugs used to treat rare 
diseases. We view it as a pilot study because it is based on a convenience sample of individuals 
affiliated with a university. Because there is no universally accepted definition of an orphan 
disease or orphan drug, and the term carries strong normative overtones, we avoided use of the 
term “orphan drug” in the experiment and instead focused on the underlying characteristics 
associated with orphan diseases. We explicitly include a condition’s rarity and severity as 
attributes in our choice scenarios as these characteristics are often emphasized in defining orphan 
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diseases.  Further, the description of the context for the choice scenarios implies that there are no 
treatments available other than the drugs under consideration, as this feature also figures in 
debates about orphan drugs.   
 
The study investigated three specific questions: (a) other things equal, are individuals willing to 
have the government pay more for drugs used to treat rare diseases than drugs used to treat 
common diseases; (b) other things equal, are individuals willing to have government pay more 
per life-year gained for a rare disease than for a common disease; and (c) in making 
recommendations regarding public coverage, do individual place the same relative weights on 
attributes across rare and common diseases?  
 
2.0 Methods 
 
The study employs a discrete-choice methodology (DCE) to investigate individual’s preferences 
for funding drugs.  DCEs are based on the idea that people derive utility not from a good per se 
but from the underlying attributes of the good (Lancaster, 1966). As such, a DCE presents 
respondents with a series of hypothetical choices that describe the choice alternatives by their 
underlying attributes and ask respondent which alternative they prefer.  In our study, for 
instance, the attributes of the drug alternatives include the nature of the disease treated by a drug, 
a drug’s effectiveness, the cost of drug treatment (more on the attributes below).  The values of 
the attributes vary across choice scenarios, and by observing the choices people make it is 
possible to infer their preferences over the attributes of the goods under study. DCEs are 
commonly used to identify people’s preferences in a variety of non-market 
situations/services/commodities (Bateman et al. 2002; Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005; 
Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000) and have been widely utilized in health economics (Gerard 
et al., 2003; King et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2008; Lancsar and Louviere, 2008).  
 
2.1 Scenario for the Discrete-Choice Experiment 
 
To put our experiment into context, respondents were told that specialised committees meet 
regularly to consider adding new drugs to public drug program formularies. However, the large 
number of potential drugs, the limited budgets and the high costs of such programs makes public 
funding of prescription drugs a challenge. Participants were asked to imagine that they were a 
member of a government committee in the province of Ontario, Canada that makes decisions 
regarding drugs to be listed on the drug formulary for the province’s public drug plan (see 
Appendix 1 for the exact description). They were told that the drug budget is limited and there 
are more drugs available than can be funded within the budget, so choices must be made 
regarding which drugs to fund. They were then told that two drugs were being considered for 
listing on the formulary, presented with information on the two drugs and the conditions each 
5 
 
drug is used to treat, and then asked which drug they would prefer to have the government fund 
under the public plan. 
 
To reduce the chances that subjects might inject their own (erroneous) assumptions about the 
situation, the description explicitly stated that all patients were of similar age (mid-40s), marital 
status, income, education, etc. and could expect to live for 10 years without treatment. It was also 
noted that, if not treated, patients with both conditions consumed the same dollar amount of 
miscellaneous health care services in an effort to alleviate their symptoms. Finally, it was stated 
that the two drugs were identical in every respect except those characteristics explicitly described 
and that neither drug was associated with adverse side-effects. 
 
2.2 DCE Attributes and Attribute Levels 
 
Potential attributes by which to describe the choice alternatives were identified by a review of 
the debate about coverage decisions for orphan drugs. This identified more potential attributes 
than could be included in the DCE. The full list of potential attributes was reduced based on two 
main criteria: importance in the debate about orphan drugs (judged subjectively by frequency of 
mention and amount of attention given to the attribute) and ability to specify the attribute in DCE 
experiment. The attributes included in the scenarios were as follows (Table 1):
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 frequency of the disease;  
 cost of treating a single patient with the drug;  
 total cost of funding the drug (budget impact);  
 severity of the disease without the treatment; and  
 impact of drug treatment on a patient’s health 
 
Other attributes considered but not included in the final DCE (to keep the design manageable) 
were: the level of scientific evidence of clinical effectiveness for the drugs (orphan drugs often 
present lower grade clinical evidence compared to evidence for common diseases), the lack of 
available alternative treatments (orphan drugs might treat conditions that do not offer other 
therapies), and the cost-effectiveness ratios (orphan drugs often exhibit high incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios and have poor value for money). The exact wording of the characteristics’ 
descriptions is provided in Appendix 2.  
 
Frequency of the disease 
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 As discussed below, disease frequency was incorporated through labeled alternatives in the design, so Table 1 lists 
the four attributes associated with each of the two disease types. 
6 
 
Frequency of the disease treated by a drug is a primary attribute of interest. As noted, disease 
frequency was used as a label in the alternatives within each choice, and not as an explicit 
attribute. This allowed us to specify the other four attributes as alternative-specific and to test 
statistically whether respondents weigh the importance of an attribute differently across rare and 
common diseases. Frequency took on two levels: rare and common. Following the definitions of 
orphan diseases, we defined a rare disease as one with an incidence rate of less than 1 case per 
2000 people; correspondingly, a common disease was defined as having an incidence rate of 
more than 1 case per 2000 people. To aid understanding, the information was presented for a 
reference population of 10 million people (the approximate population of Ontario), with rare 
diseases having an annual incidence of fewer than 5000 cases and common diseases having an 
annual incidence of more than 5000 cases. 
 
Cost of treating a single patient   
 
Cost-per-patient was included as an indicator of the costliness of the drug treatment, and its 
inclusion allowed us to identify respondents’ views regarding the amount the government should 
be willing to pay at the margin for a drug treatment. To eliminate any potential confusion, the 
description emphasized that the full cost of treating a single patient occurred over a three-month 
period and that no other costs were incurred after this treatment period. Cost-per-patient took on 
seven levels ranging from $1,000 to $100,000: 3 levels ($15,000, $50,000 and $100,000) occur 
only for rare disease alternatives, 3 levels ($1000, $5000, and $10,000) occur only for common 
disease alternatives, and one level ($12,000) occurs for both disease frequencies. The labeled 
design (described in more detail below) allows us to specify different levels for a given attribute 
across the two labeled alternatives, in our case, rare and common diseases. Other things equal, 
we expected that subjects to prefer that government fund drugs with lower cost-per-patient.    
 
Total cost of funding the drug program  
 
Formulary committees commonly consider not only cost-per-patient but also the total budget 
impact. This distinction can be particularly important for rare diseases, which can have a very 
high cost-per-patient but small budget impact because so few people have the disease. Total 
budget impact took on seven levels ranging from $5 million to $200 million: once again, 3 levels 
($5 million, $10 million and $20 million) occur only for rare diseases, 3 levels ($150 million, 
$150 million and $200 million) occur only for common diseases, and one level ($50 million) 
occurs for both disease frequencies. Other things equal, we expected subjects to prefer that 
government fund drugs with lower total budget impact.   
 
Severity of the disease without treatment  
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Severity of disease is consistently identified as a factor that individuals consider important for 
resource allocation in health care (Dolan and Olsen 2002). In the experiment, severity of disease 
if not treated could take on two values: serious and moderate impact. Severity was described in 
terms of the impact of the disease on a patient’s quality of life and on the patient’s self-assessed 
health status. The quality of life descriptions emphasized a patient’s functioning with respect to 
their mobility, activities of daily living, and pain levels, and were based on health state levels of 
the EQ-5D classification system corresponding to the Mobility, Usual Activities, and 
Pain/discomfort (Dolan, 1997). “Serious” severity corresponded to a self-assessed health rating 
of “poor”, while “moderate” severity corresponded to a self-assessed health rating of “good” 4.   
Although in some instances members of the public do not prioritize those who are severely ill 
(Dolan et al., 2008; Donaldson et al., 2008), other things equal, and considering that all drugs 
considered return patients to full health, we expected respondents to prefer that the government 
fund drug that treat those with a seriously severe condition rather than those with a moderately 
severe condition.  
 
Impact of drug treatment on a patient’s health  
 
The last attribute was the health gain due to the drug treatment. The health gain was specified in 
terms of life-years gained as a result of treatment. This attribute took on four levels ranging from 
1 to 15 life years gained. In addition, respondents were told that, regardless of the baseline 
severity, each drug would return the patient to excellent health-related quality of life for their 
remaining lifetime. Other things equal, we expected respondents to prefer that the government 
funds drugs that produce a larger number of life-years gained.   
 
Interactions Among Attributes 
 
The design allowed for interactions among attributes. In choice experiments interaction effects 
are expected to account for a small portion of the variation (between 5 and 15 percent of the 
variance) and hence selected two-way interactions are normally sufficient (Hensher et al., 2005). 
The design accounted for three interactions: that between cost-per-patient and total cost, between 
cost-per-patient and severity, and between severity and impact of treatment on health. 
 
2.3 DCE design 
 
Dependence among a subset of Attributes 
                                                 
4
 Using the EQ-5D scoring function from 0.0 (dead) to 1.0 (perfect health) (Dolan et al., 1995), and assuming that 
individuals face no problems with their self-care or anxiety/depression, we get the following utilities: Serious 
(EQ5D=21231): 1-(0.069+0.036+0.386+.269) = 0.24; Moderate (EQ5D=11121): 1-(0.123) = 0.877.  The health 
scores enabled us to relate our health states to utility values, but they were not presented to the respondents, who 
saw only the verbal descriptions.  
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The design of the choice experiment was complicated by the fact that three of the attributes are 
linearly dependent. By definition, total budget impact (or total cost, TC) equals the product of the 
disease frequency (F) and cost-per-patient (CP): TC=F*CP. Hence, assigning values to two of 
them automatically determines the third. Yet we judged it important to specify explicit 
quantitative values for cost attributes rather than qualitative categories such as “high cost” vs. 
“low cost” or “good value for money” vs. “poor value for money.”   To resolve this problem, we 
varied independently the levels of the two cost attributes and left the disease frequency 
(incidence rates) to be the determined attribute that varied in the background within defined 
bounds consistent with a rare disease or a common disease. That is, the two cost attribute levels 
were chosen in such way that the implied incidence rates were lower than 1 in 2000 cases for 
rare alternatives and greater than 1 in 2000 for common alternatives. For example, if the total 
cost is assumed to be $50 million, a cost-per-patient of less than $25,000 is consistent only with 
a common disease (frequency of more than 5000, or an incidence rate of more than 1 in 2000 in a 
population of 10 million) and a cost-per-patient of $25,000 or more is consistent only with a rare 
disease (frequency of 5000 or less). Combinations of total cost and cost-per-patient correspond 
accordingly with incidence rates of less than 1 in 2000 people for a rare disease and greater than 
1 in 2000 people for a common disease. Respondents never saw the implied incidence rates; they 
simply saw the labels “rare” or “common” disease.   
 
We employed a labelled, forced-choice experimental design. Unlike generic experiments, 
labelled experiments brand each alternative, which subsequently carries information and 
meaning that is likely to influence the choice outcomes. Moreover, such designs allow for 
different sets of attribute levels across the alternatives. Hence, for every decision, respondents 
faced a choice between: a drug used to treat a rare disease with specified attribute levels for each 
of cost-per-patient, total budget impact, severity of disease and life-years gained by treatment; 
and a drug used to treat a common disease with correspondingly specified attribute levels. 
 
Forced experiments constrain respondents to express a preference (i.e., make a trade-off among 
attributes) even when both alternatives are unattractive. Hensher et al. (2005) argue that such a 
design is preferred when the objective of the study is to examine “the impact of the relationships 
different attribute levels have upon choice” (p. 176), such as is the case in our setting.   
 
2.4 Experimental design 
 
A full-factorial, labelled design with three four-level attributes and one two-level attributes 
generates 16,384 possible combinations (L
MA 
= 4
2*3
 * 2
2
=16,384), hence a fractional factorial 
design was used. Allowing for two-way interactions a D-efficient (D-efficiency = 0.817) 
fractional factorial design was produced with 64 pair-wise choices (Kuhfeld, 2005; Zwerina et 
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al., 1996), which we blocked into 4 blocks of 16 choices each. All aspects of the experimental 
design were performed using SAS 9.1.3 built-in capabilities (Kuhfeld, 2005).  
 
2.5 Econometric methods 
 
The utility an individual derives from choosing an alternative is assumed to comprise two 
components, a deterministic component and a stochastic component. Assuming an additive 
deterministic component to utility,  
K
k ikqkiq
XV
1
 , and a stochastic component to utility, iq , 
the utility of an individual q choosing alternative i is  
 
iq
K
k ikqkiqiqiq
XVU    1        (eq. 1) 
 
where i denotes the choice alternative, k denote the attributes and q denotes an individual, and 
k are the utility parameters to be estimated. k  are assumed to be homogeneous across the 
population.  
 
Conditional Logit versus Latent Class Models 
 
Assuming iq to be independent and identically distributed (iid) extreme value type I (EV1), 
))exp(exp()(  F  gives rise to the McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit (CL), for which the 
probability that individual q chooses alternative i from a among a set of J alternatives is: 
 
 

J
j jq
iq
iq
V
V
P
1
)exp(
)exp(
        (eq. 2) 
 
The conditional logit model has a number of attractive features and is the standard approach to 
analyzing data from choice experiments, but it does impose some restrictive assumptions that 
often fail to hold (Hensher et al., 2005). In particular, its assumption of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), its failure to incorporate preferences heterogeneity in the utility 
parameters and its inability to account for the panel structure of data has led researchers to 
identify models with more flexible structures.  A commonly used alternative is the mixed logit 
model; and more recently, some have argued that the semi-parametric latent-class model (LCM) 
often performs as well or better than the mixed logit (Greene and Hensher, 2003; Hole, 2008).  
 
In the LCM, parameter heterogeneity across individuals is modeled with a discrete distribution 
over a set of classes. “Individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of C classes, but which class 
contains any particular individual, whether known or not to that individual, is unknown to the 
analyst” (Greene and Hensher, 2003) (p.682).  The IIA is imposed only within classes and not on 
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the observed unconditional probabilities. The probability that individual q chooses alternative i 
in choice set t conditional on falling within class c is  
 
 

J
j cjqt
ciqt
ciqt
X
X
P
1
|
)exp(
)exp(


        (eq. 3) 
 
Following Greene and Hensher (2003) let qty denote a specific choice made such 
that )|(| cclassiyProbP qtcqt  . Hence, given a specific class assignment 
 
 
T
t cqtcq
PP
1 ||
             (eq. 4) 
 
Additionally, let qcH be the probability that individual q falls in class c 
 
 

C
c cq
cq
qc
z
z
H
1
)exp(
)exp(


         (eq. 5) 
 
where qz is a set of variables that characterize the probabilities for class membership.  
Following from eq. 4 and eq. 5, for c classes the likelihood for individual q is  
 
cq
C
c qcq
PHP
|1            (eq. 6) 
 
The number of latent classes is not determined endogenously but is determined a priori, based on 
the performance of alternative models with respect to information criteria such as the Akaike 
(AIC), the Bayesian (BIC) and the Hannan-Quinn (HQIC) (Hole, 2008; Swait and Adamowicz, 
2001; Hannan and Quinn, 1979). We estimate and compare both conditional logit and latent-
class models.  
 
Variable Specification 
 
In addition to the choice attributes, our specification of iqtV  includes three two-way interactions 
(total cost ∙ cost-per-patient; cost-per-patient ∙ severity; severity ∙ life-years-gained) and 
information on cut-offs as described in Section 2.6. As explained below, such modifications 
allow for the relaxation of restrictive assumptions regarding the linearity of the attribute effects. 
Because of the labeled design, all attributes can be specified as generic or alternative-specific; a 
Wald test for the equality of attribute coefficients across rare and common alternatives can 
identify if alternative-specific attributes are appropriate.  
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We present results in three ways:  the estimated model coefficients, marginal rates of substitution 
among attributes (Bennett and Adamowicz, 2001) (with standard errors calculated using the delta 
method), and changes in the predicted probability of choosing a choice alternative caused by 
changes in the choice attributes. We are particularly interested in marginal rates of substitution 
between attributes and cost, which conveys marginal willingness to pay for an attribute.  The 
marginal willingness to pay values are computed for changes evaluated at the means of the 
attributes; for the LCM they are (along with the estimated coefficients), class specific. The 
changes in probabilities are computed for unitary changes at the mean of the regressors for total 
budget, cost-per-patient and life-years gained and for discrete changes for frequency and 
severity, while keeping the rest of the attributes to their sample mean values. All estimation and 
calculations were performed using Nlogit 4.0.  
 
2.6 Allowing for discontinuities in Marginal Utility by Incorporating Decision Cut-offs 
 
By definition, discrete choice experiments are based on trades-offs between attributes. More of 
one attribute is assumed to compensate for less of another (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait, 2000). 
However, in making choices individuals often employ decision heuristics that violate such 
compensatory behavior. Such heuristics can include, elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) and 
conjunctive rules (Dawes, 1964) in which subjects follow cut-offs when making choices. A cut-
off is a decision rule that sets limits beyond which the subject would never choose an alternative 
(e.g. a ‘rule’ that one would never buy a house without a swimming pool or they would never 
pay more than $X for a specific product). However, even when individual use such cut-off rules, 
the evidence shows that they often do not follow them strictly (Huber and Klein, 1991; Swait, 
2001).  In a sense, rather use hard cut-offs individuals seem to employ soft cut-offs, or 
thresholds, around which the marginal utility of an attribute level varies. This possibility is 
important because standard discrete-choice experiments assume no such discontinuities in the 
marginal utility of attributes.  
 
The difficult nature of the decision problems we presented subjects regarding drug coverage 
suggested to us that they might employ non-compensatory decision heuristics. We therefore 
included in our study a component that would enable us to test for discontinuous utility with 
respect to attributes. In implementing this we followed Swait (2001), who proposed a penalising 
utility function that allows for cut-off violation and approximates/simulates a number of non-
compensatory behaviours. In this framework, decision cut-offs are not “hard” in the sense that a 
person never violates them; rather, it assumes that subjects suffer a greater loss in utility at the 
margin the further one is from the threshold (i.e., there is a utility penalty for such a choice). 
 
Implementing this approach required that we collect, for each attribute in the study, information 
on the value of each respondent’s cut-offs (below or above which they would “never” choose an 
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alternative).   For example, if a subject agreed that “the government should not fund drug 
treatments that extend life fewer than 5 years”, this would provide information regarding the 
lower cut-off (or threshold) the subject placed on the attribute life-years-gained.    
 
Following Swait (2001), for choice i and k attributes, allowing for cut-offs modifies the 
deterministic component of eq. 1, as follows  
 
   k kikk kkikkkkk ikki dXvXcwXU ),0max(),0max(    (eq. 7) 
 
Where kc and kd are the lower and upper cut-offs as stated by the respondent, 
),0max( ikk Xc  identifies the magnitude of the violation of the lower bound cut-off and 
),0max( kik dX  identifies the corresponding violation for the upper bound cut-off.   For an 
attribute with a negative marginal utility (e.g., cost), let the initial negative slope be βk (see 
Figure 1).  If a subject were to choose an alternative with a cost over a specific upper threshold 
“d”, marginal utility falls at a higher rate (βk + vk); if they choose an alternative with cost below 
“c”, marginal utility falls at a lower rate (βk + wk).  Marginal utility displays kinks, where “c” 
and “d” are the lower and upper cut-offs. Our specification does not include both upper and 
lower threshold for an attribute, but it does include upper cut-offs for some attributes and a lower 
cut-off for others, so eq. 7 above includes two indicator variables, k  and k , where  k takes on 
a value of 1 if the attribute is hypothesized to have a lower cut-off and 0 otherwise, and k takes 
on value of 1 if the attribute is hypothesized to have an upper cut-off and 0 otherwise. 
 
As, Swait (2001) further shows, cut-off violation is possible even for binary indicators, where a 
violation becomes itself a dummy variable indicating a case where the level of the attribute 
differs from that stated in the cut-off elicitation exercise. The subjects completed the cut-off 
elicitation questions before completing the choice experiment. The elicitation method involved 
asking subjects a series of questions formulated as “I would never pay more than $X to fund this 
drug” (see Appendix 3).  
 
The cut-off information is integrated into the analysis by including in the regression the second 
and third terms of eq. 1, with their coefficients estimated along with the rest of the parameters. 
The magnitude and statistical significance of the associated coefficient estimates provides a test 
of the importance of discontinuities in the subjects’ decisions (compared to a model that assumes 
cut-offs are not present) (Danielis and Marcucci, 2007). Non-significant coefficients on the cut-
off variables imply that such cut-off values play no role in decision-making. 
 
2.7 Survey Development and Administration  
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Development of the survey instrument was refined by two pre-tests. The first pre-test was 
conducted among a convenience sample of colleagues, research staff and graduate students early 
in the development of the instrument. This pre-test focused on basic aspects of the survey design 
such as the instructions, design of the choice scenario, and specification of the attributes. The 
second pre-test was conducted among a sample of 50 individuals drawn from the subject pool 
and focused on final refinement of the survey, clarity and understanding by respondents, and 
testing the procedures for administering the survey. As part of this pre-test respondents also 
completed open-ended questions regarding the clarity and difficulty of the content and length of 
time required to complete the survey. In addition, five in-depth interviews with a random sample 
of the pre-test subjects provided further insight into points of ambiguity or other problems. 
Revisions were made in light of the feedback.  
 
For the main survey, a random sample of individuals drawn from a subject database maintained 
by the McMaster University Experimental Economics Laboratory and invited to participate in 
the study. Following recommendations on sample size (Hensher et al., 2005; Lancsar and 
Louviere, 2008), 20 to 50 participants per block was deemed adequate for robust estimation, 
suggesting a target a sample of 200 individuals. The vast majority of subjects were students. Past 
experimental valuation studies (Maguire et al., 2003; Depositario et al., 2009) have concluded 
that the views of students often closely represent those of the broader community of non-
students. However, given the use of a convenience sample of individuals from the university, we 
view this study as a pilot that can produce initial evidence and inform the design of subsequent 
studies in the general community. All participants were compensated $8 for their participation. 
 
The full survey was administered electronically in the McMaster University Experimental 
Economics Laboratory. Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the Hamilton Health 
Sciences/McMaster University Research Ethics Board. 
 
3.0 Results 
 
3.1 Sample descriptive statistics 
 
213 respondents completed the survey. The sample characteristics are as follows (Table 2): 59% 
was female; mean age was approximately 22 years; 80% reported excellent or very good health 
status; about 30% had a part-time job; for 6.5% and 17.4% the father or the mother, respectively, 
was unemployed; for approximately 87%, their parents owned their house; and 32% financed 
their education at least partly through a registered education savings plan (RESP), which are 
generally used by those with above-average income.  
 
3.2 Multivariate Results  
 
14 
 
Model Selection 
 
Information criteria (AIC, BIC, HQIC) indicated that the 2-class LCM performed better than the 
traditional conditional logit
5
 (CL: AIC = 1.026, BIC= 1.048, HQIC = 1.033; LCM: AIC = 0.97, 
BIC=1.047, HQIC = 1.003). Within the LCM, specifying more than 2 classes often resulted in 
convergence problems and singularities in the variance matrices. However, in cases in which 
convergence was achieved, the specification with 2 classes was preferred to the specification 
with more than two classes. A test of the joint statistical significance of the alternative-specific 
attributes indicated that a generic model was preferred ( 2 =15.058; p-value = 0.37). We 
therefore present results from the 2-class LCM with generic attribute-coefficients. Finally, an 
LR-test ( 2 = 51.1; p-value = 0.000) implied the joint significance of the cut-offs and, hence 
they were kept in the model. 
 
Coefficient Estimates 
 
Table 3(a) presents the results of the logit model regarding the probability each individual falls 
into each of the two latent classes, with assignment being based on a set of personal 
characteristics. Among the characteristics included in the model only sex, father’s employment 
status and whether the respondent’s university education is at least partly financed by a 
registered education savings plan are statistically significant predictors of class membership. The 
table presents the logit coefficients, so the results imply that the odds that a female is in class 1 
are 0.42 times those of than a male; the odds that a subject whose father is unemployed is in class 
1 are 0.08 those of a person whose father is employed; and the odds that a subject who finances 
their education at least partly through a RESP is in class 1 are 2.81 times those who do not.
6
 The 
two classes are of approximately equal size with the average probability that a respondent falls 
into class 1 being 46% and the average probability for class 2 being 54%. 
 
Table 3(b) presents the attribute coefficients for each class. We discuss the estimates separately 
for each class and then compare them. For class 1, the significant common disease intercept 
indicates that, all else equal, respondents preferred that the government fund drugs for common 
diseases.  The coefficients on both total budget impact and cost-per-patient are not statistically 
significant for either common or rare diseases, implying that neither cost attribute influenced 
preferences over funding for a drug.  Neither are the interaction terms involving these two cost 
attributes (TC*CP and CP*SEV) statistically significant.  The coefficients for baseline disease 
severity and for life years gained by treatment are significant and positive. As expected, 
                                                 
5
 For completeness the LCM was also compared to a MXL and both fit the data equally well.  We present the LCM 
results because the LCM is a more parsimonious model and the estimates are more easily interpreted with respect to 
the relevant policy issues. 
6
 Odds ratios are obtained by exponentiating the coefficients, i.e. exp(-0.8773)=0.42; exp(-2.5895)=0.08; 
exp(1.0317)=2.81. 
15 
 
respondents prefer that government fund a drug to treat a serious condition rather than a 
condition of moderate severity, and that it fund a drug that produces more life years gained. 
Table 4 presents the impact of a one-unit change (or discrete change) in each attribute on the 
probability that subjects prefer funding a drug. The change from rare to common disease 
increases this probability by about 30 percentage points, while the corresponding effect for the 
two cost attributes is not statistically different from zero. For severity, the probability that a 
subject prefers to have government fund a drug used to treat severe condition was 22 percentage 
points higher than for a moderate condition. For life-years gained by treatment, an increase of 1 
life-year gained increases by 4.5 percentage points the probability that a subject prefers to have 
government fund a drug.  
 
For class 2, though the trend again favours a common disease, the common disease intercept is 
smaller and not statistically significant, indicating that frequency of disease exerted little 
influence on subjects choices. The coefficient estimates on both total budget impact (TC) and 
cost-per-patient (CP) are negative and statistically significant.  It appears, therefore, that for class 
2 costs influence choice in the expected direction (greater cost reduces the probability of funding 
a drug).  The coefficient on the interaction term TC*CP is statistically significant and possesses 
an unexpected positive sign. However, the aggregate effect (TC+CP+TC*CP) is negative over 
values of CP and TC that appear in our design.
7
 The implied magnitudes of these cost effects are 
as follows: a $1 million dollar increase in the total budget impact is predicted to decrease the 
probability that a drug is chosen by a 0.07 percentage points; for cost-per-patient, an $1000 
increase in cost-per-patient is predicted to decrease the probability that a drug is chosen by 0.12 
percentage points. As we saw for class 1, the coefficient estimates for both baseline severity of 
illness and life-years gained are positive and statistically significant, and the estimates again 
imply large effects on choice. The probability that a drug is chosen for government funding is 
29.5 percentage points higher if it is used to treat a severe condition than if it is used to treat a 
moderate condition.  And an increase in 1 life-year gained raises the probability that a drug is 
chosen for government funding by 4.9 percentage points. The interactions term CP*SEV has an 
unexpected positive sign, implying that for cases involving a serious disease an increase in CP 
makes the alternative more attractive. As expected, the interaction effect is positive for severity 
and life years (SEV*LYG). 
 
The coefficients estimates associated with the cut-off analysis are presented at the bottom of 
Table 3. None of the estimates approach statistical significance for class 1, while for class 2 there 
is evidence of discontinuity with respect to two attributes: disease severity and life-years gained 
by treatment. Hence, for those in the sample that stated an a priori intention to not fund anything 
with a moderate severity but subsequently violated it, the estimate implies that the “penalty” is    
-0.191 “utils”: the coefficient for choosing a moderate condition is 0 (i.e., baseline of a binary 
                                                 
7
 The aggregate effect becomes positive only when the three highest TC values (100, 150, 200) are interacted with 
the highest CP value (100), which does not appear in our design (see attribute levels definition, Table 1). 
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indicator), hence, the penalty is: 0 + (-0.191)). Similarly, for those stating an intention to not 
fund anything that extended life less than 5 years, choosing a drug that generates fewer than 5 
additional life-years has a negative impact on utility. The magnitude of the penalty is larger than 
that the effect of the attribute itself and implies that for drugs that produce fewer than 5 
additional life-years, the utility obtained from life years is negative (0.1823 - 0.5335 = -0.3512).   
 
Marginal rates of substitution  
 
Tables 5 and 6 present marginal rates of substitution (MRS) among selected attributes. The 
calculated MRSs are meaningful only when both attribute coefficients are statistically 
significant. Hence for class 1 (Table 5), we present MRSs only with respect to severity and life 
years gained by treatment. On average, individuals of class 1 are willing to forgo 4.6 life years to 
fund a drug that treats a serious condition rather than a moderate one. This implies that 
individuals are equally willing to have government fund a drug that treats a serious condition as a 
drug that treats a moderate condition and produces an additional 4.6 life years gained for 
recipients.   
 
Individuals in the second class (Table 6) are willing to forgo slightly more life-years gained (7.4) 
to treat a serious condition rather than a moderate one. The significance of the cost attributes in 
class 2 allows for the calculation of monetary marginal willingness-to-pay. Individuals are 
willing to have government spend an extra $174,640 per-patient to fund a drug used to treat a 
serious condition compared to a drug used to treat a moderate condition. They are willing to have 
government incur an additional total cost of $190 million to treat a serious rather than moderate 
condition. 
 
Finally, all else equal, individuals are willing to have the government spend an additional 
$26,160 cost-per-patient for an extra life-year gained by treatment and an additional $27.44 
million in total to fund a drug that provides an extra life year gained for all those who receive 
treatment.   
 
4.0 Discussion 
 
This exploratory study is a first attempt to present empirical evidence regarding individual 
preferences about funding for drugs used to treat orphan diseases. The frequency of a disease in a 
population is only one feature of a disease relevant to funding coverage decisions, making 
discrete-choice methodology well-suited for investigating how and to what extent disease 
frequency influences people’s judgments regarding public funding for a drug.  
 
Our study was designed to answer three specific questions with regard to coverage decisions: (a) 
other things equal, are individuals willing to have the government pay more for drugs used to 
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treat rare diseases than drugs used to treat common diseases; (b) other things equal, are 
individuals willing to have government pay more per life-year gained for a rare disease than for a 
common disease; and (c) in making recommendations regarding public coverage, do individual 
place the same relative weights on attributes across rare and common diseases.  
 
Our results indicate that the answer to the first question is no: other things equal, a subset of 
people (class 1) actually appear willing to have government pay less for drugs used to treat rare 
diseases; however, another subset (class 2) makes no distinction based on frequency of disease.  
 
For the second question our results indicate the answer to be also no: people do not appear 
willing to pay more per life-year gained for those who suffer from a rare disease than those who 
suffer from a common disease. Statistical tests rejected the alternative-specific models in favour 
of a single generic specification, which implies that individuals do not weigh attributes 
differently across common and rare diseases when making funding decisions. Our results, 
however, do indicate heterogeneous preferences between the two latent classes. For those who 
fall in latent class 1, costs do not exert a meaningful influence on choice; for those who fall in 
latent class 2 and for whom costs do exert an important influence on decisions, the willingness-
to-pay for an additional life year gained by treatment did not differ between common and rare 
diseases.  
 
Finally, the results indicate that the answer to the third question is no:  respondents did not 
weight attributes in a meaningfully different way across common and rare diseases. The Wald 
test could not reject the null hypothesis of no difference, so that coefficient estimates are not 
statistically different from each other.  
 
We do find large effects for those attributes that the literature on priority-setting suggests we 
should: severity of disease and treatment effectiveness. For both latent classes, the influence of 
these two attributes outweighs all other influences. These findings are also consistent with the 
findings of NICE’s Citizens Council — the only other evidence currently available regarding the 
public’s views on coverage for drugs used to treat orphan diseases — that rareness itself does not 
justify special consideration, but rather that severity, established evidence of effectiveness and 
the life-threatening character of the disease weighed more heavily (NICE Citizens Council, 
2004). Our findings regarding the lack of emphasis on costs for those in class 1 are consistent 
with a Canadian study that used a citizen jury to investigate public views on criteria for priority-
setting for health technology assessment.  Members of the citizen jury argued that cost should 
not be considered during priority-setting for HTA but that high incidence, quality of life and 
potential to extend life should be among the top criteria (Menon and Stafinski, 2008). In 
particular, “of greatest importance was the ‘potential to benefit a number of people’ reflecting 
the jury’s view that technologies for highly incident/prevalent conditions within a population 
should be given higher priority over less prevalent ones. 
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The differences in choice behavior across the two classes may reflect the broader divisions in the 
debate about coverage decision-making. There is no such thing as a single “view”; rather, there 
is systematic heterogeneity that the LCM was able to identify. Specifically, one approach to 
coverage decision-making (Class 1) put little weight on cost considerations, focusing almost 
exclusively on severity and treatment effect; in contrast, the second (Class 2) considered costs in 
addition to severity and treatment effect. Note that an individual’s class cannot be identified (i.e. 
latent) but overall, across the whole sample, the two tendencies are almost of equal frequency. 
Hence, in debates about coverage decision-making, one would expect differing positions, one of 
which emphasizes the importance of considering costs and one who which downplays such 
considerations. Interestingly, our results also suggest that the decisions of males and those of 
higher socio-economic status (father employed and finances education through registered savings 
accounts) have a stronger tendency to downplay considerations of costs. The ability to 
accommodate such heterogeneity is a strength of the LCM and the likely reason why both in this 
and previous studies (Greene and Hensher, 2003; Hole, 2008) it performed better than the more 
commonly applied CL model. 
 
Our results find some evidence of discontinuity for two attributes in Class 2, indicating that the 
marginal utilities of severity and life-years gained are not constant over the whole range of 
values presented. However, the forced-choice nature of our design may have compromised our 
ability to accurately identify such effects and exaggerated their presence. For instance, an 
individual may have faced two alternatives, both of which violated a decision cut-off (e.g., life-
years gained for each alternative was below the respondent’s self-declared cut-off), but still was 
forced to choose one as the preferred alternative.  Even with such potential exaggeration, raw 
averages present little evidence of cut-off violation (Table 2).  It should be noted that our main 
results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the cut-off variables from the model. 
 
The assumption that treatment restored individuals to full health resulted in some loss of realism 
for the choice scenario, but was done for two primary reasons. First, it created a cognitively 
simpler choice task for the respondents. Pre-testing revealed that explicitly varying baseline 
severity, number of life-years gained and post-treatment quality of life was cognitively much 
more difficult to evaluate.  Second, including a separate attribute for post-treatment quality of 
life would create saliency problems and would require imposing design restrictions with respect 
to severity.  For example, a drug used to treat a severe disease that resulted in a higher quality of 
life than a drug used to treat a moderate disease could potentially raise questions about the 
effectiveness of the drugs, which was outside the scope of this study.  
 
Further, our statement in the scenario description that all patients were of a similar age (mid-40s) 
was included ensure that respondents used the same reference point for all alternatives when 
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making choices. There is evidence that individual preferences regarding health can vary with the 
age of the patient (Dolan et al., 2005)), but it potentially limits the generalizability of our results 
to patient populations of a different age.  
 
Overall, our results indicate that the participants (in this case, represented by a university-
affiliated sample from Ontario, Canada) do not support differential consideration of orphan 
diseases for coverage decision-making. They therefore send a cautionary message about 
implementing special coverage rules for drugs to treat orphan diseases. Two considerations, 
however, should determine the role of this evidence in the debate. First, even assuming we have 
accurately elicited the views of the public, such preferences are not necessarily determinative in 
resolving difficult ethical problems such as funding treatments for orphan diseases. The 
resolution of such issues normally requires consideration of both sound ethical reasoning from 
principles and the preferences and attitudes of members of society. Second, as the first empirical 
results on this question, these findings should be seen as tentative and subject to further research 
both in different populations (i.e. generalizability of student samples is hard to advocate) and 
using modified designs (i.e. more comprehensive utility functions e.g. degree of rareness) to 
validate any conclusions. Although it is reasonable to observe differences in views across 
populations, such research can help identify potential framing effects associated with any single 
study and those aspects of the results that are robust across studies.  
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Table 1: Attributes definitions and levels 
Attributes Levels Coding 
 
Rare disease alternative  
  
The cost of treating a single patient (CP) 
 
 
 
$12,000 
$15,000 
$50,000 
$100,000 
12 
15 
50 
100 
The total cost of funding the drug 
program (TC) 
 
 
$5 million total cost 
$10 million total cost 
$20 million total cost 
$50 million total cost 
5 
10 
20 
50 
The severity of the disease without 
treatment (SEV)  
 
Serious Impact 
Moderate Impact 
Serious Impact=1 
Moderate Impact=0 
The impact of drug treatment on a 
patient’s health/life years gained (LYG)   
 
15 years 
10 years 
5 years 
1 year 
15 
10 
5 
1 
 
Common disease alternative  
  
The cost of treating a single patient (CP) 
 
 
 
$1,000  
$5,000 
$10,000 
$12,000 
1 
5 
10 
12 
The total cost of funding the drug 
program (TC) 
 
 
$50 million total cost 
$100 million total cost 
$150 million total cost 
$200 million total cost 
50 
100 
150 
200 
The severity of the disease without 
treatment (SEV) 
 
Serious Impact 
Moderate Impact 
Serious Impact=1 
Moderate Impact=0 
The impact of drug treatment on a 
patient’s health/life years gained (LYG)  
 
15 years 
10 years 
5 years 
1 year 
15 
10 
5 
1 
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics  
Total # participants 213 (100%) 
  
Individual characteristics    
Mean age (sd; min, max) 21.6 (4.9; 18, 60) 
Sex  
   Female 125 (58.7%) 
Self-assessed Health Status  
   Excellent/Very Good 171 (80.3%) 
Know someone with chronic disease (Base = No)  
   Yes-Rare disease (Dis_Rare) 35 (16.4%) 
   Yes-Common disease (Dis_Com) 87 (40.9%) 
McMaster University Status   
   Graduate 10 (4.7%) 
   Faculty/Staff   9 (4.3%) 
Work Status  
   Working part-time 63 (29.6%) 
   Working full-time 10 (4.7%) 
Part of your university education paid with funds from a 
Registered Education Savings Plan (RESP) 
 
Yes 69 (32.4%) 
  
Family characteristics  
Parent’s housing tenure  
   Owner  185 (86.9%) 
Father’s employment status   
   Unemployed/Not applicable     18 (6.5%) 
Mother’s employment status  
   Unemployed/Not applicable   37 (17.4%) 
  
Stated cut-offs (% of choices that violated the cut-off)  
TC140: Cut-off violated when an individual chooses alternative with 
TC higher than 140mil, when initially s/he had identified it as the 
maximum TC they would be willing to incur.  
11.4% 
  
CP80: Cut-off violated when an individual chooses alternative with 
CP higher than 80 thousand, when initially s/he had identified it as 
the maximum CP they would be willing to incur. 
4.7% 
  
LYG5: Cut-off violated when individual chooses alternative with LY 
gained of less than 5 years, where initially s/he had identified it the 
7.6% 
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minimum amount they would require. 
  
SevSer: Cut-off violated when individual chooses alternative with 
moderate severity, while initially s/he had stated that government 
should only fund diseases with serious impact. 
19.7% 
 
26 
 
  
Table 3.  Latent Class Model Results (2 Classes) 
 
(a) Logistic Regression Results for Class Assignment 
Constant 1.6478  -- 
 (2.2201)   
Sex (female) -0.8773**  -- 
 (0.4045)   
Age -0.0265  -- 
 (0.0853)   
Dis_Rare -0.3143  -- 
 (0.6047)   
Dis_Com 0.5671  -- 
 (0.4204)   
Health 0.2374  -- 
 (0.6107)   
Faculty/Staff 0.878  -- 
 (1.8086)   
Graduate student 0.8862  -- 
 (1.0383)   
Part-time employed 0.0516  -- 
 (0.4173)   
Full-time employed -1.6451  -- 
 (1.5174)   
Parents own house 0.1165  -- 
 (0.5448)   
Father unemployed -2.2895***  -- 
 (0.8284)   
Mother unemployed 0.6392  -- 
 (0.4871)   
RESP 1.0317**  -- 
 (0.5046)   
Average class probabilities  0.458    0.542 
 
(b) Attribute Estimates, by Class 
 Class1  Class 2 
Common disease (intercept) 1.4124***  0.1021 
 (0.1972)  (0.0718) 
Total Budget (TC) -0.0004  -0.0071*** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0007) 
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Cost-per-patient (CP) 0.0052  -0.0078*** 
 (0.0037)  (0.0014) 
Severity of Disease (SEV) 1.321***  1.1154*** 
 (0.3208)  (0.1114) 
Life-years Gained (LYG) 0.2017***  0.1823*** 
 (0.0247)  (0.0076) 
TC*CP -0.0001  0.0002*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.000) 
CP*SEV -0.0035  0.0016 
 (0.0033)  (0.0013) 
SEV*LYG -0.0389*  0.0263*** 
 (0.0228)  (0.01) 
TC140 -0.0079  -0.0013 
 (0.0061)  (0.0018) 
CP80 0.0138  0.0024 
 (0.0169)  (0.006) 
SevSer 0.1122  -0.191** 
 (0.3815)  (0.0954) 
LYG5 -0.076  -0.5335*** 
 (0.1174)  (0.0468) 
# of individuals 213 
# of obs. 6816 
Log-L -1629.680 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Change in the Probability of Choosing a Drug Associated with a One-Unit Change in an 
Attribute  
 Class1  Class 2 
Common disease (intercept) 0.3041  0.0255 
Total Budget (TC) -0.0005  -0.0007 
Cost-per-patient (CP) -0.0004  -0.0012 
Severity of Disease (SEV) 0.2185  0.295 
Life-years Gained (LYG) 0.0455  0.0487 
Note: changes are computed for unitary changes at the mean for TC, CP, LYG and for discrete changes for 
frequency and SEV, while keeping the other attributes at their sample mean.  
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Table 5. Marginal rates of substitution in monetary and life years for Class 1 
 Marginal WTP in 1000$ 
of CP 
Marginal WTP in millions of $ 
TC 
Marginal WTP in life years 
forgone 
a 
Moderate 
to Serious  
-- -- -4.64 
   (1.24) 
A life year 
gained 
-- -- -- 
    
Standard errors in parentheses computed through the delta method 
a
 WTP calculations are computed at the mean of the attributes. i.e. for the figure in the table we would have 

SEV  CP*SEV *Mean(CP) SEV*LYG *Mean(LYG)  (LYG)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Marginal rates of substitution in monetary and life years for Class 2 
 Marginal WTP in 1000$ 
of CP 
Marginal WTP in millions of $ 
TC 
Marginal WTP in life years 
forgone 
Moderate 
to Serious  
174.64 190.48 -7.43 
 (33.01) (21.33) (0.44)    
A life year 
gained 
26.16       27.44 -- 
 (4.6) (2.81)  
Standard errors in parentheses computed through the delta method 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The impact of cutoff violation on a negatively sloped attribute (e.g. cost) (from Swait, 2001, p. 912).  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
Exact description and wording of discrete choice experiment exercise.  
 
 
In this part of the questionnaire we are interested in your preferences with respect to funding drugs. Each scenario 
will present information about two health conditions, a drug used to treat each of them, the effect of each drug on a 
patient’s health, and the cost of each drug. For each scenario you will be asked to choose which drug you would 
prefer that the government include within its public drug plan. If a drug is funded by the public plan patients with 
the condition can obtain the drug free of charge. The two drugs, the diseases they treat, and the individuals who 
suffer from the diseases differ only with respect to the attributes listed in the scenario. All other aspects of the 
decision problem should be assumed identical across the two choice options.  
 
Example Scenario 
 
Imagine that you are a health care decision maker on an Ontario government committee that has been asked to 
decide which of two drugs will be included within the public drug insurance program. Both drugs are used to treat 
conditions that arise in the general population. When answering the question below, assume that the characteristics 
of patients who develop the respective diseases are identical in all respects (e.g., age, marital status, income, 
education, etc.) except those explicitly mentioned. The two drugs are also identical except with respect to attributes 
described below; neither drug is associated with adverse side-effects. The money used to fund the chosen drug will 
come from the provincial public health care budget, which in 2008 was $46 billion. Only one drug can be funded. 
Please indicate whether you prefer to fund drug A or drug B by placing a tick on one of the boxes below. There are 
no right or wrong answers. 
 
Example choice problem:  
Drug A used to treat a 
Common disease 
 
Drug B used to treat a 
Rare disease  
 
The cost of treating a single patient  $10,000 per patient $12,000 per patient 
The total cost of funding the drug program  $20 million to fund $100 million to fund 
The severity of the disease without treatment Serious Impact Moderate Impact 
The impact of drug treatment on a patient’s health  Gain of 1 year Gain of 10 years 
 
Which drug program would you prefer?                     Prefer to fund drug A                   Prefer to fund drug B   
(tick one box only)                                               
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Appendix 2 
 
Exact wording of the five characteristics’ descriptions.  
 
 
- The Frequency of the disease in the population 
 
This attribute indicates how often the disease occurs in the population. This can take on two values: 
 
Rare disease:  the disease is rare, with less than one case occurring each year for each 2000 people in the 
population. In a population of 10 million people (the approximate population of Ontario), fewer than 5000 
cases would occur each year. 
 
Common disease: the disease is common, with more than one case occurring each year for each 2000 
people in the population. In a population of 10 million people (again, the approximate population of 
Ontario), more than 5,000 cases would occur each year.     
 
 
- The Cost of treating a single patient   
 
This attribute indicates the total one-time treatment cost for a single patient. All treatment costs arise 
during a three-month treatment period; no additional treatment costs occur once this is completed. There 
are seven possible cost values: 
 $1,000  
 $5,000 
 $10,000 
 $12,000 
 $15,000 
 $50,000 
 $100,000  
 
 
- The Total cost of funding the drug program  
 
This attribute indicates the total annual cost to the Ministry of Health if the drug program is funded 
publicly. There are seven possible costs should a drug be funded by the public plan: 
 $5 million total cost 
 $10 million total cost 
 $20 million total cost 
 $50 million total cost 
 $100 million total cost 
 $150 million total cost 
 $200 million total cost 
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- The severity of the disease without treatment  
 
This attribute indicates the seriousness of a disease if the patient does not obtain treatment.  All the 
diseases you will be asked to consider strike people in their mid-40s. In all cases, once diagnosed, patients 
who do not receive treatment die prematurely; without treatment, they can expect to live 10 years 
following diagnosis. Each disease also affects a person’s quality of life. The impact on quality of life can 
take on two values (even after taking into account the effect of miscellaneous services patients seek in an 
effort to relieve symptoms):   
 
Serious Impact:  Patients who suffer from this disease have trouble with their mobility, need help with 
daily activities and suffer from strong pain. Overall, when asked to rate their health as excellent, good, 
fair or poor, most patients with the disease rate their health as poor.    
 
Moderate Impact:  Patients do not have trouble with their mobility or daily activities, but suffer from 
minor pain, discomfort, and need rest until their complaints disappear. Overall, when asked to rate their 
health, most patients with the disease rate their health as good.  
 
Note: Regardless of whether the impact is serious or moderate, patients who are not treated with a drug 
consume the identical dollar value of miscellaneous health care services in an effort to alleviate their 
symptoms.    
 
- The Impact of Drug Treatment on a Patient’s Health  
 
The drug treatment improves both quality of life and expected length of life. In all cases, the drug returns 
recipients to excellent health-related quality of life while alive. The impact of the drug treatment on life 
expectancy takes on four possible values:  
 
 Patients treated with the drug expect to live 15 years longer than those with the disease who do 
not receive treatment. That is, rather than live only 10 years after diagnosis,  a patient treated with 
the drug can expect to live 25 years. 
 Patients treated with the drug can expect to live 10 years longer than those with the disease who 
do not receive treatment. That is, rather than live only 10 years after diagnosis, a patient treated 
with the drug can expect to live 20 years.   
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 Patients treated with the drug can expect to live 5 years longer than those with the disease who do 
not receive treatment. That is, rather than live only 10 years after diagnosis, a patient treated with 
the drug can expect to live 15 years. 
 Patients treated with the drug can expect to live 1 year longer than those with the disease who do 
not receive treatment. That is, rather than live only 10 years after diagnosis, a patient treated with 
the drug can expect to live 11 years. 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
In this part of the questionnaire we ask you to indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of a 
series of statements listed below. Please read each statement carefully before responding, as differences 
between some statements are small but important. For each statement, please indicate whether you agree 
or disagree by placing a tick in the appropriate box.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I Agree I Disagree 
1. The government should not fund drug treatments for conditions with total 
cost higher than $140 million.   
2. The government should not fund drug treatments for conditions with cost 
per patient higher than $80,000.   
3. The government should not choose to fund drug treatments that extend life 
less than 5 years.   
4. The government should only fund drug treatments that have a serious 
impact on the health status of the patient.   
